---
summary: "Browser-based control UI for the Gateway (chat, nodes, config)"
read_when:
  - You want to operate the Gateway from a browser
  - You want Tailnet access without SSH tunnels
title: "Control UI"
---

# Control UI (browser)

The Control UI is a small **Vite + Lit** single-page app served by the Gateway:

- default: `http://<host>:18789/`
- optional prefix: set `gateway.controlUi.basePath` (e.g. `/openclaw`)

It speaks **directly to the Gateway WebSocket** on the same port.

## Quick open (local)

If the Gateway is running on the same computer, open:

- [http://127.0.0.1:18789/](http://127.0.0.1:18789/) (or [http://localhost:18789/](http://localhost:18789/))

If the page fails to load, start the Gateway first: `openclaw gateway`.

Auth is supplied during the WebSocket handshake via:

- `connect.params.auth.token`
- `connect.params.auth.password`
- Tailscale Serve identity headers when `gateway.auth.allowTailscale: true`
- trusted-proxy identity headers when `gateway.auth.mode: "trusted-proxy"`

The dashboard settings panel keeps a token for the current browser tab session
and selected gateway URL; passwords are not persisted. Onboarding usually
generates a gateway token for shared-secret auth on first connect, but password
auth works too when `gateway.auth.mode` is `"password"`.

## Device pairing (first connection)

When you connect to the Control UI from a new browser or device, the Gateway
requires a **one-time pairing approval** — even if you're on the same Tailnet
with `gateway.auth.allowTailscale: true`. This is a security measure to prevent
unauthorized access.

**What you'll see:** "disconnected (1008): pairing required"

**To approve the device:**

```bash
# List pending requests
openclaw devices list

# Approve by request ID
openclaw devices approve <requestId>
```

If the browser retries pairing with changed auth details (role/scopes/public
key), the previous pending request is superseded and a new `requestId` is
created. Re-run `openclaw devices list` before approval.

Once approved, the device is remembered and won't require re-approval unless
you revoke it with `openclaw devices revoke --device <id> --role <role>`. See
[Devices CLI](/cli/devices) for token rotation and revocation.

**Notes:**

- Direct local loopback browser connections (`127.0.0.1` / `localhost`) are
  auto-approved.
- Tailnet and LAN browser connects still require explicit approval, even when
  they originate from the same machine.
- Each browser profile generates a unique device ID, so switching browsers or
  clearing browser data will require re-pairing.

## Language support

The Control UI can localize itself on first load based on your browser locale.
To override it later, open **Overview -> Gateway Access -> Language**. The
locale picker lives in the Gateway Access card, not under Appearance.

- Supported locales: `en`, `zh-CN`, `zh-TW`, `pt-BR`, `de`, `es`, `ja-JP`, `ko`, `fr`, `tr`, `uk`, `id`, `pl`
- Non-English translations are lazy-loaded in the browser.
- The selected locale is saved in browser storage and reused on future visits.
- Missing translation keys fall back to English.

## What it can do (today)

- Chat with the model via Gateway WS (`chat.history`, `chat.send`, `chat.abort`, `chat.inject`)
- Stream tool calls + live tool output cards in Chat (agent events)
- Channels: built-in plus bundled/external plugin channels status, QR login, and per-channel config (`channels.status`, `web.login.*`, `config.patch`)
- Instances: presence list + refresh (`system-presence`)
- Sessions: list + per-session model/thinking/fast/verbose/trace/reasoning overrides (`sessions.list`, `sessions.patch`)
- Dreams: dreaming status, enable/disable toggle, and Dream Diary reader (`doctor.memory.status`, `doctor.memory.dreamDiary`, `config.patch`)
- Cron jobs: list/add/edit/run/enable/disable + run history (`cron.*`)
- Skills: status, enable/disable, install, API key updates (`skills.*`)
- Nodes: list + caps (`node.list`)
- Exec approvals: edit gateway or node allowlists + ask policy for `exec host=gateway/node` (`exec.approvals.*`)
- Config: view/edit `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json` (`config.get`, `config.set`)
- Config: apply + restart with validation (`config.apply`) and wake the last active session
- Config writes include a base-hash guard to prevent clobbering concurrent edits
- Config writes (`config.set`/`config.apply`/`config.patch`) also preflight active SecretRef resolution for refs in the submitted config payload; unresolved active submitted refs are rejected before write
- Config schema + form rendering (`config.schema` / `config.schema.lookup`,
  including field `title` / `description`, matched UI hints, immediate child
  summaries, docs metadata on nested object/wildcard/array/composition nodes,
  plus plugin + channel schemas when available); Raw JSON editor is
  available only when the snapshot has a safe raw round-trip
- If a snapshot cannot safely round-trip raw text, Control UI forces Form mode and disables Raw mode for that snapshot
- Structured SecretRef object values are rendered read-only in form text inputs to prevent accidental object-to-string corruption
- Debug: status/health/models snapshots + event log + manual RPC calls (`status`, `health`, `models.list`)
- Logs: live tail of gateway file logs with filter/export (`logs.tail`)
- Update: run a package/git update + restart (`update.run`) with a restart report

Cron jobs panel notes:

- For isolated jobs, delivery defaults to announce summary. You can switch to none if you want internal-only runs.
- Channel/target fields appear when announce is selected.
- Webhook mode uses `delivery.mode = "webhook"` with `delivery.to` set to a valid HTTP(S) webhook URL.
- For main-session jobs, webhook and none delivery modes are available.
- Advanced edit controls include delete-after-run, clear agent override, cron exact/stagger options,
  agent model/thinking overrides, and best-effort delivery toggles.
- Form validation is inline with field-level errors; invalid values disable the save button until fixed.
- Set `cron.webhookToken` to send a dedicated bearer token, if omitted the webhook is sent without an auth header.
- Deprecated fallback: stored legacy jobs with `notify: true` can still use `cron.webhook` until migrated.

## Chat behavior

- `chat.send` is **non-blocking**: it acks immediately with `{ runId, status: "started" }` and the response streams via `chat` events.
- Re-sending with the same `idempotencyKey` returns `{ status: "in_flight" }` while running, and `{ status: "ok" }` after completion.
- `chat.history` responses are size-bounded for UI safety. When transcript entries are too large, Gateway may truncate long text fields, omit heavy metadata blocks, and replace oversized messages with a placeholder (`[chat.history omitted: message too large]`).
- `chat.history` also strips display-only inline directive tags from visible assistant text (for example `[[reply_to_*]]` and `[[audio_as_voice]]`), plain-text tool-call XML payloads (including `<tool_call>...</tool_call>`, `<function_call>...</function_call>`, `<tool_calls>...</tool_calls>`, `<function_calls>...</function_calls>`, and truncated tool-call blocks), and leaked ASCII/full-width model control tokens, and omits assistant entries whose whole visible text is only the exact silent token `NO_REPLY` / `no_reply`.
- `chat.inject` appends an assistant note to the session transcript and broadcasts a `chat` event for UI-only updates (no agent run, no channel delivery).
- The chat header model and thinking pickers patch the active session immediately through `sessions.patch`; they are persistent session overrides, not one-turn-only send options.
- Stop:
  - Click **Stop** (calls `chat.abort`)
  - Type `/stop` (or standalone abort phrases like `stop`, `stop action`, `stop run`, `stop openclaw`, `please stop`) to abort out-of-band
  - `chat.abort` supports `{ sessionKey }` (no `runId`) to abort all active runs for that session
- Abort partial retention:
  - When a run is aborted, partial assistant text can still be shown in the UI
  - Gateway persists aborted partial assistant text into transcript history when buffered output exists
  - Persisted entries include abort metadata so transcript consumers can tell abort partials from normal completion output

## Hosted embeds

Assistant messages can render hosted web content inline with the `[embed ...]`
shortcode. The iframe sandbox policy is controlled by
`gateway.controlUi.embedSandbox`:

- `strict`: disables script execution inside hosted embeds
- `scripts`: allows interactive embeds while keeping origin isolation; this is
  the default and is usually enough for self-contained browser games/widgets
- `trusted`: adds `allow-same-origin` on top of `allow-scripts` for same-site
  documents that intentionally need stronger privileges

Example:

```json5
{
  gateway: {
    controlUi: {
      embedSandbox: "scripts",
    },
  },
}
```

Use `trusted` only when the embedded document genuinely needs same-origin
behavior. For most agent-generated games and interactive canvases, `scripts` is
the safer choice.

Absolute external `http(s)` embed URLs stay blocked by default. If you
intentionally want `[embed url="https://..."]` to load third-party pages, set
`gateway.controlUi.allowExternalEmbedUrls: true`.

## Tailnet access (recommended)

### Integrated Tailscale Serve (preferred)

Keep the Gateway on loopback and let Tailscale Serve proxy it with HTTPS:

```bash
openclaw gateway --tailscale serve
```

Open:

- `https://<magicdns>/` (or your configured `gateway.controlUi.basePath`)

By default, Control UI/WebSocket Serve requests can authenticate via Tailscale identity headers
(`tailscale-user-login`) when `gateway.auth.allowTailscale` is `true`. OpenClaw
verifies the identity by resolving the `x-forwarded-for` address with
`tailscale whois` and matching it to the header, and only accepts these when the
request hits loopback with Tailscale’s `x-forwarded-*` headers. Set
`gateway.auth.allowTailscale: false` if you want to require explicit shared-secret
credentials even for Serve traffic. Then use `gateway.auth.mode: "token"` or
`"password"`.
For that async Serve identity path, failed auth attempts for the same client IP
and auth scope are serialized before rate-limit writes. Concurrent bad retries
from the same browser can therefore show `retry later` on the second request
instead of two plain mismatches racing in parallel.
Tokenless Serve auth assumes the gateway host is trusted. If untrusted local
code may run on that host, require token/password auth.

### Bind to tailnet + token

```bash
openclaw gateway --bind tailnet --token "$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
```

Then open:

- `http://<tailscale-ip>:18789/` (or your configured `gateway.controlUi.basePath`)

Paste the matching shared secret into the UI settings (sent as
`connect.params.auth.token` or `connect.params.auth.password`).

## Insecure HTTP

If you open the dashboard over plain HTTP (`http://<lan-ip>` or `http://<tailscale-ip>`),
the browser runs in a **non-secure context** and blocks WebCrypto. By default,
OpenClaw **blocks** Control UI connections without device identity.

Documented exceptions:

- localhost-only insecure HTTP compatibility with `gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth=true`
- successful operator Control UI auth through `gateway.auth.mode: "trusted-proxy"`
- break-glass `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth=true`

**Recommended fix:** use HTTPS (Tailscale Serve) or open the UI locally:

- `https://<magicdns>/` (Serve)
- `http://127.0.0.1:18789/` (on the gateway host)

**Insecure-auth toggle behavior:**

```json5
{
  gateway: {
    controlUi: { allowInsecureAuth: true },
    bind: "tailnet",
    auth: { mode: "token", token: "replace-me" },
  },
}
```

`allowInsecureAuth` is a local compatibility toggle only:

- It allows localhost Control UI sessions to proceed without device identity in
  non-secure HTTP contexts.
- It does not bypass pairing checks.
- It does not relax remote (non-localhost) device identity requirements.

**Break-glass only:**

```json5
{
  gateway: {
    controlUi: { dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth: true },
    bind: "tailnet",
    auth: { mode: "token", token: "replace-me" },
  },
}
```

`dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth` disables Control UI device identity checks and is a
severe security downgrade. Revert quickly after emergency use.

Trusted-proxy note:

- successful trusted-proxy auth can admit **operator** Control UI sessions without
  device identity
- this does **not** extend to node-role Control UI sessions
- same-host loopback reverse proxies still do not satisfy trusted-proxy auth; see
  [Trusted Proxy Auth](/gateway/trusted-proxy-auth)

See [Tailscale](/gateway/tailscale) for HTTPS setup guidance.

## Building the UI

The Gateway serves static files from `dist/control-ui`. Build them with:

```bash
pnpm ui:build # auto-installs UI deps on first run
```

Optional absolute base (when you want fixed asset URLs):

```bash
OPENCLAW_CONTROL_UI_BASE_PATH=/openclaw/ pnpm ui:build
```

For local development (separate dev server):

```bash
pnpm ui:dev # auto-installs UI deps on first run
```

Then point the UI at your Gateway WS URL (e.g. `ws://127.0.0.1:18789`).

## Debugging/testing: dev server + remote Gateway

The Control UI is static files; the WebSocket target is configurable and can be
different from the HTTP origin. This is handy when you want the Vite dev server
locally but the Gateway runs elsewhere.

1. Start the UI dev server: `pnpm ui:dev`
2. Open a URL like:

```text
http://localhost:5173/?gatewayUrl=ws://<gateway-host>:18789
```

Optional one-time auth (if needed):

```text
http://localhost:5173/?gatewayUrl=wss://<gateway-host>:18789#token=<gateway-token>
```

Notes:

- `gatewayUrl` is stored in localStorage after load and removed from the URL.
- `token` should be passed via the URL fragment (`#token=...`) whenever possible. Fragments are not sent to the server, which avoids request-log and Referer leakage. Legacy `?token=` query params are still imported once for compatibility, but only as a fallback, and are stripped immediately after bootstrap.
- `password` is kept in memory only.
- When `gatewayUrl` is set, the UI does not fall back to config or environment credentials.
  Provide `token` (or `password`) explicitly. Missing explicit credentials is an error.
- Use `wss://` when the Gateway is behind TLS (Tailscale Serve, HTTPS proxy, etc.).
- `gatewayUrl` is only accepted in a top-level window (not embedded) to prevent clickjacking.
- Non-loopback Control UI deployments must set `gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins`
  explicitly (full origins). This includes remote dev setups.
- Do not use `gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins: ["*"]` except for tightly controlled
  local testing. It means allow any browser origin, not “match whatever host I am
  using.”
- `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback=true` enables
  Host-header origin fallback mode, but it is a dangerous security mode.

Example:

```json5
{
  gateway: {
    controlUi: {
      allowedOrigins: ["http://localhost:5173"],
    },
  },
}
```

Remote access setup details: [Remote access](/gateway/remote).

## Related

- [Dashboard](/web/dashboard) — gateway dashboard
- [WebChat](/web/webchat) — browser-based chat interface
- [TUI](/web/tui) — terminal user interface
- [Health Checks](/gateway/health) — gateway health monitoring
